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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by Appellants-Defendants, City of Meridian and City of Garden City 
(hereafter "Cities"). The Cities appeal from an Order of the Fourth Judicial District Court sitting 
en bane, dismissing an action seeking declaratory relief filed by Plaintiffs, Ada County and the 
Board of Ada County Commissioners, (hereafter "County") (Ada County Case No. CV-OC-
2010-24980). The Cities also appeal from entry of an Order, filed on May 11, 2012, denying the 
Cities' Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order entered by the District Court against the Cities in 1994. 
This 2012 administrative order was entered and stamped by the Ada County Clerk's Office but 
does not have a case number. The Order is titled "IN RE: FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, STAFF, 
PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES AND OTHER EXPENSES OF THE MAGISTRATE DIVISION." 
(R. pp 416-431) 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The 2010 Complaint for Declaratory Relief filed by the Respondent County sought an 
order from the District Court to: (1) confirm the validity of the 1994 Administrative Order 
requiring the Cities to provide separate magistrate court facilities; (2) expand the scope of the 
Order to include both civil and criminal magistrate cases; and (3) require the Cities to provide a 
compliance plan for making the court provisions. (R. Vol. I, pp. 5-36.) Appellants Cities denied 
the allegations and set forth numerous affirmative defenses, including, that the Cities were 
denied due process of law in the original entry of the 1994 Order and that the circumstances had 
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changed significantly since the 1994 Order was entered thereby ending the necessity of the 
Order. (R. Vol. I, pp. 59-78.) 
Initially the Cities filed a Joint Motion to DisqualifY the judges of the Fourth Judicial 
District from sitting on the case and requested that a district judge from outside the Fourth 
Judicial District be assigned to the case. (R. Vol. I, pp. 80-81.) At a scheduling conference 
before the Honorable Judge Timothy Hansen on February 24, 2011, the parties were informed 
that the matter would be heard by an en bane panel of the Fourth Judicial District. (R. Vol. I, p. 
79.) The Cities objected to the en bane panel sitting on the case on the basis that the Complaint 
for Declarat01J1 Relief was a civil action and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure did not provide 
for the utilization of an en bane panel. (R. Vol. I, pp. 143-144.) The Cities Motion and 
Objection were heard on September 17, 2011 en bane by the Fourth Judicial District. 1 (R. Vol. I, 
p. 187.) In separate written decisions the judges sitting on the Panel denied the Cities' Motion. 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 188-248.) 
Subsequently, the Cities filed a Joint Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order on the specific 
bases that the judges exceeded their statutory authority pursuant to I.C. § 1-1622 and because the 
Cities had not been afforded due process of law when the 1994 Order was initially issued. (R. 
Vol. I, pp. 262-265.) The Motion was again heard en bane by the Fourth Judicial District. On 
May 11, 2012 the Panel issued a (1) Memorandum Decision, (2) an Order Denying Motion to 
1 The Honorable Michael Wetherell did not sit due to his participation, as a Boise City Councilman, in the 
construction of the present Ada County Courthouse and Administration Building and the closure of the magistrate 
facility on Barrister Street. 
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Vacate 1994 Order, and (3) a Judgment Dismissing Declaratory Judgment Action. (R. Vol. L 
pp. 416-419, 420-429, 430-431.) The Memorandum Decision held that the declaratory judgment 
action was an "inappropriate mechanism" to determine the validity of the 1994 Order and 
dismissed the County's declaratory judgment lawsuit. In the same decision the Panel, citing to 
its inherent court powers, chose to convert the Cities Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order (filed in 
the now dismissed declaratory judgment action) into a Petition by the Cities to vacate the 1994 
Order. (R. Vol. I, pp. 417-418). In doing so the Panel indicated that it was opening up the 1994 
administrative process in which the earlier 1994 Order had been entered. 
In the Order Denying ,Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order, the Panel held in relation to the 
issuance of the 1994 Order that: "Due process does not require the judges to engage in 
formalized process to come to a conclusion that a city's magistrate division caseload justifies 
imposing a requirement to provide facilities." (R. Vol. I, p. 427.) The Panel further ordered the 
Cities to prepare a plan for the Administrative Judge indicating how the Cities intended to 
comply with the 1994 Order. (Id.) 
The Panel also stated that the Cities did not challenge the 1994 Order on the grounds of 
caseload or a substantial and material change in circumstance. This holding was without basis. 
The Cities initially argued their motion to vacate based on the lack of due process. The Cities 
did not concede the other issues and did not anticipate that the Cities' motion in the declaratory 
judgment lawsuit, after oral argument, would lead to a reopening of the administrative process 
and a administrative order directing compliance with the 1994 Order. 
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C. ST A TEMENT OFF ACTS 
In 1993, then Trial Court Administrator for the Fourth Judicial District, John Traylor, 
requested that the City of Boise file a petition with the Fourth Judicial District asking the District 
Judges to: 
[A ]ppoint a special master to conduct discovery and hold hearings 
for the purpose of recommending to the District Judges that the 
cities of Meridian and Garden City should contribute money to the 
operation of the Ada County magistrate division located on 
Barrister Drive in the City of Boise. 
(,1ffidavit of William L. lvf Nary in Support of Garden City and Meridian's Motion to Vacate the 
I 994 Order (hereinafter "Nary Alf"), R. Vol. I, p. 266.) Mr. Traylor told the City of Boise that 
then Administrative Judge of the Fourth Judicial District, Gerald Schroeder, was prepared to 
appoint W.E. Smith, a retired District Judge, to act as the special master once the petition was 
filed. (Nary Aff., R. Vol. I, pp. 266-67.) 
On June 10, 1994, the City of Boise and Ada County signed an unverified Petition to the 
District Judges of the Fourth Judicial District (hereinafter the "Petition") consistent with the 
petition that Mr. Traylor had requested the City of Boise file. (Nary Aff, Exh. A., R Vol. I, pp. 
272-275.) The Petition was signed by then Boise City Attorney Amanda Horton and Ada 
County Prosecutor Greg H. Bower on behalf of the City of Boise and Ada County respectively. 
(Nary Ajf., Exh. A, R. Vol. I, p.275; Affidavit of Debbie Allen (hereafter "Allen Ajf.", Exh. 1, p. 
4., R. Vol. I, p.303 ). In short, the Petition asked the District Judges to: 
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[A]ppoint a Special Master, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 53 to gather evidence, hold hearings, and report to the 
District Judges of the Fourth Judicial his/her finding regarding the 
level of contributions for the operation of the Magistrate Division 
of the Fourth Judicial District by the Cities of Meridian and 
Garden City. 
(Nary AJl, Exh. A, R. Vol. I, p.274) (emphases added). The Petition also requested that the 
special master be allowed to "assess the potential of also including the Cities of Kuna and Eagle 
in this cost-sharing arrangement." (Id. at p. 275.) 
On June 2 L 1994, the City of Boise hand delivered a copy of the Petition to John Traylor. 
(Nary Ajf, R. Vol. I, p. 267.) (noting that the Petition was "filed w/ John Traylor 6/21/94 4: 15 
p.m.") The Petition was not filed with the Ada County Clerk. (Nary Aff, R. Vol. I, p. 267.) The 
Petition was not served on the Cities. (Id.) 
On August 12, 1994, seven District Judges of the Fourth Judicial District signed a 
document entitled "Order" (hereinafter the "1994 Order") in the matter "Jn Re: Facilities, 
Equipment, Staff Personnel, Supplies and Other Expenses of the Magistrate Division." (Naty 
A.ff, Exh. B. R. Vol. I, pp. 277-278.) Later that same day, Mr. Traylor personally served the 
1994 Order on Meridian and Garden City. (Nary Ajf., Exh. C, R. Vol. I, p. 280.) 
The 1994 Order required the cities of Meridian and Garden City to "provide by October 
1, 1994 suitable and adequate quarters for the magistrate's division of the Fourth Judicial 
District. ... " (Nary A.ff, Exh. B, R. Vol. I, pp. 277-278.) The text of the 1994 Order reveals that 
the District Judges signed the document after "[h]aving reviewed the Petition filed by the City of 
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Boise and Ada County .... " (Id.) The 1994 Order makes no reference to the District Judges 
having held any hearings, gathered any evidence, or done anything other than "having reviewed 
the Petition" before signing the 1994 Order. (Id.) Likewise, there is no evidence on the record 
suggesting that the District Judges held any hearings or considered any testimony or evidence 
other than the unverified Petition before signing the 1994 Order. (See, e.g., Nary Aff., R. Vol. I, 
p. 267.) 
On August 26, 1994, the City Attorneys for the cities of Meridian and Garden City signed 
a joint "Motion for Reconsideration or Delay in Execution" and a "Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Reconsider or Delay Imposition". (Nary A.ff,~ 7, Exh. D, R Vol. I, pp. 283-284.) On 
that same day, the City of Meridian served the Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in 
Support on the City of Boise and Ada County. (Nary Aff, Exh. D, R. Vol. I, pp. 285-295; Allen 
Afl, R. Vol. I, pp. 305-319.) The City of Meridian also filed the motion and supporting briefing 
with the Ada County Clerk in the matter of "Jn Re: Facilities, Equipment Staff Personnel, 
Supplies and other Expenses of the Magistrate Division." (Allen Ajf, Exh. 2, R. Vol. I, p. 320). 
The copy of the Motion for Reconsideration in the City of Boise's file bears the date stamp of 
Ada County Clerk David Navarro. 
As set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider or Delay Imposition, 
the cities of Meridian and Garden City requested that the District Judges reconsider the 1 994 
Order primarily on the grounds that it was entered without affording the cities "due process" -
i.e. notice and the opportunity to be heard. (Nary Aff., Exh. C, R. Vol. I, pp. 285-295.) First, the 
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cities pointed out that neither Meridian nor Garden City had been served with the Petition or 
even notified that it had actually been filed with the Fourth Judicial District. (Id. at pp. 285-287.) 
Second, Meridian and Garden City objected to the District Judges signing the 1994 Order "ex-
parte" and after considering only the information included in the unverified Petition. (Id. at pp. 
285-287, 286-287.) Third, the cities challenged the fact that the 1994 Order had been signed 
without the District Judges holding any hearings at which either Meridian or Garden City were 
invited to attend or allowed to be heard. (Id.) In sum, the cities argued that they "were denied 
due process in this matter" and requested that the District Judges set the 1994 Order aside. (Id. at 
pp. 289, 290.) 
Although the cities of Meridian and Garden City had requested a hearing on their joint 
Motion for Reconsideration or Delay in Execution, the District Judges did not allow the cities a 
hearing. (Nmy Alf., R. Vol. I, p. 268.) Further, it appears that the District Judges never ruled on 
the motion, as there are no subsequent orders either denying or granting the same. (Id.) 
By letter dated August 24, 1994 to Garden City, the Trial Court Administrator, John 
Traylor, set forth what he felt were the minimum requirements for establishing a magistrate 
facility. He also addressed some logistic and fiscal concerns raised by the Garden City Attorney. 
(Affidavit of Heather McCarthy in Opposition to Garden City and A1eridian 's A1otion to Vacate 
the 1994 Order (hereinafter "McCarthy Alf."), Exh. G., R. Vol. I, pp. 3 79-383.) By letter to 
Judge Schroeder dated September 1, 1994, Meridian's City Attorney, Wayne Crookston, 
explained his uncertainty as to the nature of the Order, either administrative or judicial, and how 
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to set the Motion for Reconsideration for hearing. Wayne Crookston further requested that a 
hearing or meeting be scheduled to consider the Cities' Motion. (AfcCarthy Aff, Exh. H., R. 
Vol. I, p. 384.) 
By letter dated October 19, 1994, to Judge Schroeder, Mr. Crookston recounted a 
previous telephone conversation with Judge Schroeder wherein Judge Schroeder informed Mr. 
Crookston that the District Judges had decided to continue the Order. (The alternate relief 
requested by the Cities in their Motion.) (McCarthy Aff., Exh. I., R. Vol. I, p. 385.) Judge 
Schroeder confirmed this decision by letter dated October 21, 1994. The Order was to be 
continued and effective October 1, 1995. (McCarthy Aff, Exh. J., R. Vol. I, p. 386.) No 
correspondence was sent until March 8, 1995 when John Traylor wrote the Cities and again 
detailed the requirements for magistrate court facilities in the respective Cities. (McCarthy Aff, 
Exh. L., R. Vol. L p. 389.) 
Any effort to enforce the 1994 Order ceased by October, 1995. By letter dated October 
10, I 995, John Traylor wrote the following to Wayne Crookston: 
As you know, the Ada County Commissioners are seriously pursuing 
construction of a new courthouse to be located at the intersection of Yd and Front 
Streets. The initial thoughts on design include "twin towers" concept wherein 
county administration and court functions would be located in opposite ends of 
the building .... It is my hope that each department which will be affected by this 
building, or who will be located therein, will have a chance to offer input as to 
needs. 
It is also my understanding that your City may wish to negotiate with the 
county for some space allocation in the new building. I believe that it is none too 
early for you and your staff to begin formulating ideas and suggestions for what 
your needs will be in a new courthouse. 
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(AfcCarthy Aff., Exh. M., R. Vol. I, p. 391.) 
The clear intent for the County to build and fund the new courthouse was stated in the 
contract executed by Ada County and the City of Boise in 1999. This contract was at issue in 
City of' Boise v. Ada County, 14 7 Idaho 794 (2009). The contract contained a recital which 
stated: 
WHEREAS, For reasons good and sufficient unto it, the County of 
Ada has elected to provide at its sole cost and expense a single 
courthouse complex for both the District Court and Magistrate 
Division thereof, including the functions of the District Court, both 
civil and criminal, and probate court, police court and justice as 
those functions existed prior to judicial reorganization. 
(Complaint/or Declaratory Relief, Exh. E., R. Vol. I, p. 35.) 
The 1994 Order was not discussed again until thirteen years later, when, during a 2008 
joint meeting including staff from Ada County, and the Cities of Boise, Meridian, and Garden 
City, the Ada County Commission informed the Cities that the revenue generated by court costs 
and fines was inadequate to cover the funding of the Magistrate Division of the Ada County 
District Court. UVfcCarthy Aff., Exh. P., R. Vol. I, p. 394.) Discussions ensued by the parties, 
but no agreement could be reached. Ultimately, on July 1, 2010, the County sent an invoice to 
each City for $660,350.80. (Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Exh. B, C., R. Vol. I, pp. 14-28.) 
Each City refused to pay its respective invoices and this litigation ensued. (Complaint for 
Declaratory Relief, Exhs. D, E., R. Vol. I, pp. 29-35.) 
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Although this Court noted the 1994 Order in its decision in City of Boise v. Ada County, 
147 Idaho 794, 799 (2009) and commented that the Cities had not complied with the 1994 Order, 
it must be noted that there are stark contrasts between the City of Boise's situation and the 
Appellant Cities. Unlike Boise, the Cities never provided municipal courts; Boise's municipal 
court was integrated into the unified court system in 1971. The Cities have never had a 
relationship with Ada County for the provision of court services and the Cities have never signed 
a contract for such services. Boise City sought the 1980 Order so that it could properly bond for 
the construction of a court facility. By contrast, the Cities never intended to provide a court 
facility. The City of Boise complied with its 1980 Order in one fashion or another until 2007 
and Boise's 1980 Order remained in full force and effect during that time. City of Boise v. Ada 
County. 14 7 Idaho 794 (2009). Any effort to seek enforcement of the 1994 Order was 
abandoned by Ada County and the Fourth District Court in the mid 1990's. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the Panel erred in entering its 2012 Order. 
B. Whether the Panel erred in denying Appellants' Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order. 
a. Whether the Panel erred in ruling that the 1994 Panel had employed a 
"suitable process" prior to having entered the August 12, 1994 Order. 
b. Whether the Panel erred in ruling that the Appellants were not entitled to 
any due process prior to the Panel entering the 1994 Order. 
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III.ARGUMENT 
A. The Panel erred in entering its 2012 Order. 
The Panel improperly converted Defendants' Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order, filed in 
Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment action, into a Petition to Vacate the Order, after properly 
dismissing the declaratory judgment action. 
In its Memorandum Decision entered on May 11, 2012, the en bane Panel explained the 
proper method for reviewing an I.C. § 1-2218 order. 
In further exercise of its inherent power, the en bane Panel finds that the proper 
method to consider a request to interpret, modify or vacate an existing order 
issued under I.C. § 1-2218, is the same process followed by the City of Boise 
when it filed its petition to vacate the 1980 Order requiring it to provide suitable 
and adequate quarters for a magistrate's division of the district court. Any 
affected city or entity should petition the majority of the Fourth Judicial District 
district judges, sitting en bane, to consider modifying or vacating such an order. 
(Memorandum Decision, R. Vol 1, p.418.) 
In this instance, the Cities did not petition the Court to set aside or vacate the 1994 Order. 
In fact, the Cities were brought into court as defendants in a declaratory judgment action brought 
by Ada County, and unlike Ada County in the City of Boise, the Cities were never afforded the 
opportunity to fully develop or defend their cases prior to the Panel's entry of the Order. (R. 
Vol. I, pp. 05-11). 
The Cities' filed a Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order in the declaratory judgment action 
specifically to address the issue of due process. This Motion was not intended to address every 
issue that defendants anticipated disputing in the declaratory action. (R. Vol. I, pp. 262-63). The 
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Panel in its Order Denying Motion to Vacate 1994 Order converted the Cities' civil motion in 
the declaratory judgment action into a "petition" stating that the "Cities of Garden City and 
Meridian (collectively "Cities") petitioned to vacate a prior order. ... " (R. Vol 1, p.420). This 
totally mischaracterizes the proceeding as the defendants filed a motion based on the distinct and 
isolated issue of due process in a civil action; they did not file a petition with the Court. 
The Panel then went on to state: 
Unlike the City of Boise, the Cities do not move to vacate the 1994 Order on the 
basis there has been a "substantial and material change of circumstances that 
would justify" rescinding the 1994 Order. .. They do not challenge the caseload 
and revenue date cited by the City of Boise and Ada County in their 1994 petition 
which ultimately provided the factual basis for the judges' 1994 Order. 
(R. Vol 1, p. 425) (citation omitted). The panel also noted that "there is no evidence that present 
caseloads generated by either city has gone down." (R. Vol. 1, p.426 ). 
These are improper statements or findings which totally mischaracterize the Cities' 
position. The Cities did, in their respective answers, raise the issue that there had been a 
substantial change in circumstances since 1994. Had the Cities been given the opportunity to 
have a full and fair evidentiary hearing, the Cities would have certainly raised this critical issue. 
Further, had the Cities been afforded due process in the entry of the Order in 1994, the factual 
basis for the Order could have been challenged at that time. 
The Cities filed a narrow motion in a civil declaratory judgment action. The Panel 
dismissed that action, but without basis then converted the Cities' motion into an administrative 
matter. The dismissal was appropriate, but converting the Cities' motion into an administrative 
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matter in its decision after argument, and making further administrative findings on matters not 
before the Panel was inappropriate and violated the Cities' right to due process. 
B. The Panel erred in denying the Appellants' Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order. 
Meridian City and Garden City respectfully submit that the en bane Panel erred in failing 
to vacate the 1994 Order because the 1994 Panel did not follow its statutory mandate to follow a 
suitable process or mode of proceeding which conforms to the spirit of the Idaho Code. I. C. § 1-
1622. Further, the manner in which the 1994 Order was entered denied the Cities their 
fundamental right to due process. 
a. The 2012 Panel erred in ruling that the 1994 Panel had employed a 
"suitable process" prior to having entered the August 12, 1994 Order. 
When the Panel issued the 1994 Order, it relied solely on the unverified Petition filed by 
the City of Boise and Ada County. (Order, p. l) It did not allow the Cities to submit any 
evidence, to file briefs with the Panel, present oral argument, or present its position in any 
setting. In short, despite the immediate and significant financial impact it would have on the 
Cities, the Cities were not afforded any due process in the issuance of the Order. 
In the 1994 Petition, the City of Boise and Ada County proposed a procedure that, if it 
had been followed, may have assisted the District Judges in complying with the requirements of 
Idaho Code § 1-1622 by requesting that a special master be appointed. (See Nary A.ff., Exh. A 
(specifically requesting a special master to gather evidence, hold hearings, and report to the 
District Judges)). For reasons unexplained, the District Judges did not appoint the requested 
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special master to conduct discovery and hold hearings. (Id. at ,; 5 and Exh. C.) Nor did the 
District Judges solicit evidence from the interested cities or hold any hearings at which the Cities 
were allowed to appear and be heard. Id. Instead, the District Judges simply signed the 1994 
Order after giving consideration only to the one-sided, unverified allegations contained in the 
Petition.2 
In 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court decided City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794 
(2009). That litigation began when the City of Boise filed a petition asking the District Judges of 
the Fourth Judicial District to set aside the 1980 Order which had been entered pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 1-2218 and seeking to require the City of Boise to "provide adequate quarters for a 
Magistrate's Division of the District Court .... " 14 7 Idaho 794, 801. After the City of Boise filed 
the petition, Ada County filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, which the District Judges 
granted over the City of Boise's objection. Id. In granting Ada County's motion to intervene, 
the District Judges relied on Rule 24(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which they 
believed authorized intervention as a matter of right. Id. After holding a hearing at which 
attorneys for both the City of Boise and Ada County were present, the District Judges denied the 
2 The 1994 Order began with the panel indicating that based solely on the Petition it had concluded that it was no 
longer reasonable for the City of Boise and Ada County to bear sole financial responsibility for the processing of 
citations and complaints issued by other municipalities. Order, p. 1. The panel does not have the statutory authority 
to fin that it is unreasonable for those entities to bear sole financial responsibility. In Twin Falls County v. Cities of 
Twin Falls and Filer, 143 Idaho 398, 400, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that pursuant to J.C. § 1-2218, "District 
Judges have the option to order the Cities to 'provide suitable and adequate quarters for a magistrate's division,' 
once the district judges decide not to order the Cities to provide facilities, their authority over the matter is at an 
end." 143 Idaho at 400. Further, "Granting district judges the authority to order a city to make a contribution to the 
county's courthouse effectively eliminates a city's options ... [D]istrict judges are not given the authority to decide on 
the city's behalf how the city should comply with the statute." Id. The Panel's sole authority in this matter is to 
order the Cities to provide suitable and adequate quarters for a magistrate's division. 
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City of Boise's petition and upheld the 1980 Order. Id. The City of Boise appealed. Id. 
On appeal, the City of Boise challenged, among other issues, the District Judges' decision 
to grant Ada County's motion to intervene. 147 Idaho 794, 801. The City of Boise argued that 
the District Judges erred in applying IRCP 24(a) because intervention is only permissible in a 
"civil action," and not in proceedings conducted pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-2218. Id. In other 
words, the City of Boise argued that the District Judges could not use the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure in what Boise City asserted was an "administrative proceeding." Id. Ada County, on 
the other hand, argued that the City of Boise's petition initiated a civil action to which the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure applied. Id. at 802. 
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected both Ada County's and the City of Boise's 
characterizations of the underlying proceeding and pointed out that the District Judges have 
inherent authority to fashion their own "suitable rules" when acting pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-
2218: 
We need not determine whether the proceeding fits neatly within 
the category of either a civil action or an administrative 
proceeding. By the enactment of section 1-2218, the Legislature 
vested the district judges of a judicial district with the authority to 
order cities to provide suitable and adequate quarters for a 
magistrate's division of the district court. The Legislature did not 
specify the procedures to be used in considering, issuing, 
modifying, or vacating such orders. However, the Legislature was 
obviously aware at the time that the courts possess inherent power 
to fashion suitable rules for carrying out their constitutional and 
statutory duties. Indeed, Idaho's Territorial Legislature enacted a 
provision memorializing the courts' power to fashion the 
procedures necessary to perform their duties, and that provision, in 
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its pre-statehood language, is now codified as Idaho Code section 
1-1622. 
147 Idaho 794, 802. 
Entitled "Incidental Means to Exercise Jurisdiction", I. C. § 1-1622 reads as follows: 
When jurisdiction is, by this code, or by any other statute, 
conferred on a court or judicial officer all the means necessary to 
carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of the 
jurisdiction if the course of proceedings be not specially pointed 
out by this code, or the statute, any suitable process or mode of 
proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable 
to the spirit of this code. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court analyzed whether the procedures used by the District Judges in 
allowing Ada County to intervene were suitable and in conformance with the spirit of the code. 
147 Idaho 794, 803. Although the District Judges were not bound by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Supreme Court held that "there is no reason why courts should not look to the 
procedural rules for guidance .... " Id. Entitled "Intervention of Right," I.R.C.P. 24(a) reads as 
follows: 
I.R.C.P. 24(a). 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in 
an action: (1) when a statute of the state of Idaho confers an 
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims 
an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or 
impede applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the 
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
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In analyzing Ada County's motion to intervene against the backdrop of I.R.C.P. 24(a), 
the Idaho Supreme Court directed: 
The County had a substantial financial stake in maintaining the 
efficacy of the 1980 Order. To denv it the opportunity to appear 
and be heard would be repugnant of our concepts of fairness and 
due process. 
14 7 Idaho 794, 803 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court further held that in addition to 
I.R.C.P. 24(a), the District Judges have "inherent power to grant intervention to persons who 
may be adversely affected by the outcome of a proceeding or when equitable principles 
otherwise require." Id. (citations omitted). 
In concluding that the District Judges had acted properly m allowing the County to 
intervene, the Idaho Supreme Court instructed: 
Surely, allowing a county to intervene in a city's proceeding to set 
aside a section 1-2218 order is in accordance with the spirit of the 
Idaho Code. See In Re the Petition of Idaho State Fed'n of Labor, 
75 Idaho 367, 370, 272 P.2d 707, 708 (1954) (relying on section 1 
1622 "to adopt a suitable procedure which will furnish an 
opportunity for any interested person to appear at the hearing" 
where the governing statute provides no such process or procedure 
(quoting Roche v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App. 255, 157 P. 830, 
832 (1916)).3 The Code vests counties with an interest in 
maintaining the efficacy of section 1-2218 orders. A decision 
relieving a city of its obligations under a section 1-2218 order has 
the effect of imposing those same obligations on the county. 
Because the Code vests counties with an interest in section 1-2218 
3 The holding of Roche is on point; that Court instructs, " ... it devolves upon the court in such a case to adopt a 
suitable procedure which wil I furnish as opportunity for any interested person to appear at the hearing ... that body 
may adopt any mode which preserves to the parties the fundamental essentials of notice and hearing." 30 Cal. App. 
255, 260 ( l 916). In other words, it is the Court's duty to ensure that the mode of proceedings guarantee that an 
interested party receive fundamental due process. 
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orders. g1vmg the counties the opportunity to be heard in 
proceedings regarding the continuing validity of such orders 
conforms to the spirit of the code. 
147 Idaho 794, 803-804 (emphasis added). 
Based on I.C. § 1-1622 and the City of Boise, a panel must employ a "suitable process or 
mode of proceeding ... which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this code" when 
entering Orders pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-1822. Due to the lack of any statutory mandated 
procedures that the District Judges must follow in issuing Orders under J.C. § 1-2218, the only 
limitations are simply that the process to be applied by the District Judges must be "suitable" and 
"most conformable to the spirit" of the Idaho Code. I. C. § 1 -1622. In order to conform to the 
spirit of the code, an interested party must receive the most basic fundamental procedural rights 
which include an opportunity to be heard. See City o.fBoise, 147 Idaho at 794. 
The 1994 Panel failed to follow any procedure and issued the Order based solely on the 
unverified Petition filed by the City of Boise and Ada County. The 2012 Panel erred by not 
vacating the 1994 Order for a lack of suitable procedures that conformed to the spirit of the 
Idaho Code. 
b. The 2012 Panel erred in holding that the Appellants were not entitled 
to any due process prior to the 1994 Panel entering the Order. 
In City of Boise, the Court held that a suitable process was necessary in determining 
whether to grant an interested party's request to intervene in order to ensure that party's 
fundamental right to due process. 147 Idaho 794, 803-804 ("To deny [the interested party] the 
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opportunity to appear and be heard would be repugnant of our concepts of fairness and due 
process"). However as previously stated, the 1994 Panel did not allow the cities an opportunity 
to appear, submit briefs, present oral argument, or otherwise present any evidence. The Cities 
should have been entitled to at least the minimum amount of due process when their substantial 
financial interests were at stake. 
Although the specific issue addressed in City of Boise v. Ada County dealt with Ada 
County's motion to intervene, it would be equally "repugnant of our concepts of fairness and due 
process" for the District Judges to enter an Order pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-2218 without first 
giving the subject of the order notice and an opportunity to appear and be heard. The 
fundamental requirement of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). See also U.S. 
Const. Amends. 5, 14 and Idaho Const., Art. 1, § 13 (guaranteeing that no person shall "be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.") 
Certainly, any City that is required to "provide suitable and adequate quarters for a 
magistrate's division of the district court" has a substantial financial stake in such an order. See, 
e.g., I.C. §1-2218. See also City of Boise, 147 Idaho 794, 803 (recognizing that because Ada 
County had a "substantial financial stake" in the § 1-2218 order, that the County must be given 
the opportunity to appear and be heard in any proceeding to vacate the 1980 Order). Giving the 
City notice and an opportunity to be heard before issuing an order pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-
2218 most definitely conforms to the spirit of the code. It goes without saying that notice and 
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the opportunity to be heard are frequent themes found throughout the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Idaho Code. Further, "[t]imely notice and an opportunity to be heard are of the 
essence of due process. and are jurisdictional essentials of a valid judgment." Lawrence 
Warehouse Company v. Rudio Lumber Company, 89 Idaho 389, 398 (1965) (emphasis added). 
In denying the Cities' request to vacate the 1994 Order, the 2012 Panel instructed that (1) 
the requisite procedures prior to an injunctive relief action are not warranted for the issuance of 
an Order pursuant to l.C. § 1-2218, and (2) formal process was not required because the 
legislative process itself is sufficient to comport with minimal federal due process requirements. 
(Order, pp. 6, 8). This holding is in error because the initial entry of the 1994 Order was 
inconsistent with LC. § 1-1622 and denied the Cities their fundamental right to due process. 
In the City of Boise, the Supreme Court stated that l.C. § 1-2218 does not establish any 
standards for the review of orders issued pursuant to that section. It instructed that the rules 
governing the review of permanent injunctions lend themselves to application of review of 
orders issued pursuant to I.C. § 1-2218 due to their similarity in prospective effect of imposing 
affirmative, continuing obligations on adverse parties. 14 7 Idaho 794, 804. The Supreme Court 
in that case focused its opinion on the review of injunctions because the issue in that case was a 
review of a Petition issued pursuant to I.C. § 1-2218. The Supreme Court was not directly 
addressing the due process required prior to the issuance of an Order or a permanent injunction. 
147 Idaho 794, 804. 
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Since the Supreme Court recognized the similarities between permanent injunctions and 
Orders issued pursuant to I.C. § 1-2218 and then applied the rules governing review of such 
injunctions for review of the Order at issue in that case, the Cities furthered this analogy in their 
A1emorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate and argued that the same due process should be 
required prior to an issuance of such an order. 
The 2012 Panel disagreed and held that the analogy was limited to the review of orders 
issues pursuant to I.C. §1-2218. The Panel stated, "The Supreme Court's analogy was clearly 
limited to post-decision review of orders issued under section 1-2218 and made clear that while 
the order, once issued, resembled a permanent injunction, the Supreme Court was not intending 
to impose all of the procedures attendant to injunctive relief to these J.C. § 1-2218 orders." 
(Order, p. 6). The Cities agree that the Supreme Court's analogy in Boise City was in regard to a 
post-decision review but the Cities believe that the application of rules governing review of 
orders issued pursuant to I.C. § 1-2218 and the recognition of similar future obligations and effect 
on adverse pai1ies warrant similar due process requirements for the initial entry of a permanent 
injunction and the initial entry of an order issued pursuant to J.C. § 1-2218. 
It is well established that a permanent injunction may only be entered after a full hearing 
or a trial on the merits. See 43A C.J.S. Injunctions §342 (2011) ("A suit for a permanent 
injunction is to be tried like any other law suit on the merits."). See also 43A C.J.S. Injunctions 
§359 (2011) ("A permanent injunction is properly granted only by a final decree rendered after a 
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hearing on the merits, or after the case has been matured and the defendant has been afforded an 
opportunity for such a hearing.") 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure are very clear that notice is a prerequisite to issuing a 
preliminary injunction. I.R.C.P. 65(a)(l) instructs, "Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be 
issued without notice to the adverse party." See also, e.g., J.C. §52-405 (recognizing the right to 
a trial on the merits before issuance of a permanent injunction). In Lawrence Warehouse 
Company v. Rudio Lumber Company, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order 
granting a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the defendant had been deprived of due 
process. 89 Idaho 389, 399 (1965). Specifically, the trial court failed to hold a hearing on the 
motion for preliminary injunction and the defendants were denied an opportunity to present 
evidence in opposition to the application. Id. at 398. The trial court further failed to make any 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Id. I.R.C.P. 52(a) reads in pertinent part as follows: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate 
judgment: and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunction the 
court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law which constitute the grounds of its action. 
I.R.C.P. 52(a) (emphasis added). 
In Rudio, the Supreme Court interpreted I.R.C.P. 65(a) by looking to federal case law 
analyzing its federal counterpart from which it was adopted. 89 Idaho 389, 396. The Supreme 
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Court communicated the basic understanding of due process in Idaho: "due process of law has 
been variously held to mean a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, 
and renders judgment only after trial. 89 Idaho 389, 394-95, 405 P.2d 634, 637 (1965) (citing 16 
C.J.S., Constitutional Law §567, b., p. 1143; Gilbert v. Elder, 65 Idaho 383, 387 (1943)). 
The Supreme Court found guidance in Sims v. Greene, 161 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir. Ct. App. 
194 7), which had set aside a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the trial court had 
entered it solely upon the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties and without giving any 
opportunity to the adverse party to produce oral testimony. Id. at 88. In Sims, the appellate court 
wrote persuasively as follows: 
The issuance of a preliminary injunction under such circumstances 
is contrary not only to the Rules of Civil Procedure but also to the 
spirit which imbues our judicial tribunals prohibiting decision 
without hearing. Rule 65(a) provides that no preliminary 
injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party. 
Notice implies an opportunity to be heard. Hearing requires trial 
of an issue or issues of fact. Trial of an issue of fact necessitates 
opportunity to present evidence and not by only one side to the 
controversy. 
If anything was more required to indicate with certainty that a 
preliminary injunction may not issue without giving the party 
sought to be enjoined an opportunity to present evidence on his 
behalf, it is furnished by the provisions of Rule 52(a) which 
requires the court, in all actions 'tried upon the facts without a 
jury' to state separately its conclusions of law and 'in granting or 
refusing interlocutory injunctions' 'similar [to] set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action.' The conclusion is inescapable that since a 
district court is required by rule to make findings of fact, the 
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stating, 
findings must be based on something more than one-sided 
presentation of the evidence.' 
161 F.2d at 88, 89 (emphases added). 
The 2012 Panel alternately supported its holding denying to vacate the 1994 Order by 
To treat the judges' initial assessment that a city's burden on the 
magistrate division justifies requiring that city to provide facilities 
as authorized by statute like an injunctive relief proceeding creates 
the same evils the Supreme Court avoided in City of Boise. It 
would make the judges litigants. 
(Order, p. 7). This seems to be based on the Supreme Court's discussion in City of Boise that an 
Order pursuant to I.C. § 1-2218, was neither an administrative nor a civil action. The Idaho 
Supreme Court in City of Boise indicated that the proceeding was commenced when the 1980 
Order was entered and, therefore, the proceeding could not properly be categorized as an action 
under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure because to do so would "be to treat the judges as 
litigants, rather than disinterested decision-makers." 14 7 Idaho 794, 802. The Cities believe that 
the 2012 Panel erred in reliance on this discussion for its determination that treating the judges' 
initial assessment like an injunctive relief proceeding essentially makes the judges litigants. The 
Cities never tried to frame this as a civil action or tried to initiate a proceeding where the Panel 
was essentially a litigant; The Cities have challenged the process by which the Orders have been 
entered to ensure that the parties have an opportunity to be heard, that a suitable process is 
followed, and that the Panel's action prior to issuing an Order is not arbitrary. Essentially, the 
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Cities are trying to protect their due process rights. 
The 2012 Panel also held that due process does not require the judges sitting on the panel 
to engage in some formalized process to come to a conclusion that a city's magistrate division 
caseload justifies imposing a requirement to provide facilities. (Order, p. 8). The Panel ruled 
that the Legislature made the Panel responsible for providing facilities when the Panel 
determined it was necessary and that the legislative process itself was sufficient to comport with 
minimal federal due process requirements.4 
The Panel, in conclusory fashion, cited to five cases to support its holding that the 
legislative process itself was sufficient to comport with minimal federal due process 
requirements. Appellants maintain that these cases are completely inapplicable to the instant 
action because they address due process issues in lawsuits challenging a legislative or Board 
action rather than in an action where judicial decision-making was challenged. 5 The Idaho 
Supreme Court has addressed one of the cases (Bi-Metallic, Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
4 The Cities maintain that the legislature enacted J.C. § 1-1622 so that that Panel would comport with due process by 
follow a suitable process or mode of proceeding which conforms to the spirit of the code because it was aware that 
the legislative process itself did not provide due process requirements for proceedings where judicial decision-
making was necessary. In City of Boise, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed J.C. § 1-1622 and stated. ''the 
Legislature was obviously aware ... that the courts possess inherent power to fashion suitable rules for carrying out 
their constitutional and statutory duties." 147 Idaho 794. 802. 
5 Rea v. Matteucci, 121 F.3d 483 ( 1997) (State employee action against the State alleging legislation reclassifying 
her job deprived her of due process), Adams v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2011) (Action against the 
United States challenging provisions of the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act), Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S .. 
1 15 ( 1985) (challenge to the notice provided by Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare of a congressional 
action resulting in a reduction in food stamp benefits), Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Ed of Equalization, 239 U.S. 
441 (1915), and Decatur liquors, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 360 (D.C.Cir. 2007) (Suit against the 
District of Columbia claiming that amendment to the liquor code was not passed in accordance with procedural 
requirements of Home Rule Act.) 
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239 U.S. 441 (1915)) and issued an opinion that the case does not apply to actions where there 
was judicial decision-making required. Bi-Metallic, involved a suit to enjoin the State Board of 
Equalization and the Colorado Tax Commission from putting in force an order which would 
increase the valuation of all taxable property in Denver by forty percent. In that case, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Board's action holding that plaintiffs did not have a due process 
right to challenge the Board's action: 
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is 
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its 
adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be 
done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General 
statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or 
property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without 
giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the 
only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, 
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule. 
36 S.Ct. 141, 142 (emphases added). Bi-Metallic Investment does not apply in this case because 
the Panel's action pursuant to I.C. § 1-2218 is not a public act or a statute of a general nature; it is 
judicial in nature. The Idaho Supreme Comi in City of Boise held, "[A] decision granting or 
denying a petition to set aside an existing order [under J.C. § 1-2218] involves judicial decision-
making .... " As such, this action is clearly not the type of action contemplated in the above cited 
cases and the holdings are not applicable to this situation. 
Further, in Snake River Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Caldwell, 101Idaho47 (1980), the 
Supreme Court of Idaho instructed that the holding in Bi-Metallic Investment does not apply to 
cases which involve judicial decision-making. In that case, the City of Caldwell passed a 
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resolution which revised its "Accounting Policy and Procedures Manual" with regard to its 
"water main extension policy" and included in that revision an increase in the cost of water pipe 
extensions for residential subdivisions from $2.00 per foot to $5.00 per foot. This action was 
taken without providing notice to the public or a public hearing. Snake River Homebuilders 
Association filed a complaint against the City seeking a writ of prohibition against exacting the 
$5.00 per foot extension charge and for a declaratory judgment that the action of the City in 
adopting the policy setting forth the increase was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs, in part, 
claimed the absence of public notice and hearing for the resolution deprived its members of their 
due process requirements. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating: 
The action taken by the city here was clearly legislative, as 
opposed to judicial or quasi-judicial, in nature. As such, the 
reasoning of Mr. Justice Holmes in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. 
State Board of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 36 S.Ct. 141, 
60 L.Ed. 372 (1915), is applicable: 
"Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is 
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its 
adoption. The Constitution docs not require all public acts to be 
done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General 
statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or 
property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without 
giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the 
only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, 
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule." 239 U.S. at 
445, 36 S.Ct. at 142. 
Here, the act of the city in raising the extension charge was not one 
affecting appellant only. Rather, it was a measure of general 
applicability, affecting all who received the extension service. In 
the absence of a statutory provision or ordinance requiring it, 
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appellant had no right to notice and hearing prior to the city's 
increasing the extension charge. 
101 Idaho 47, 49. 
The other four cases cited by the 2012 Panel also involve challenges to congressional or 
legislative actions which were claimed to infringe plaintiffs due process rights for not affording 
any process prior to instituting a legislative enactment and do not provide support for the holding 
that the Cities should be afforded no due process in the context of a judicial decision. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in City of Boise analyzed the review of an order issued 
pursuant to LC. § 1-2218 and held that LC. § 1-1622 give the judges the authority and 
responsibility to use its inherent power to employ a suitable process or mode of proceeding 
which conforms to the spirit of the code. The Supreme Court in City o_l Boise discussed the fact 
that the Legislature was obviously aware that the courts possess inherent power to fashion 
suitable rules for carrying out their constitutional and statutory duties pursuant to I.C. §I -1622. 
I 4 7 Idaho 794, 802. LC. §I -2218 is not narrowly applicable to review of an order issued 
pursuant to LC. §I -2218, but rather, is broadly applicable where jurisdiction is conferred on a 
court or judicial officer. LC. § 1-1622; City of Boise, 147 Idaho 794, 803 (citing Fox v. Flynn, 27 
Idaho 580 (1915)). It hardly makes sense that I.C. § 1-1622 would apply to the review of an 
order issued pursuant to I.C. § 1-2218, but would not apply to the discrete circumstance of the 
initial entry of an order issued pursuant to the same statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that the 1994 Order was entered based solely upon a one-sided 
presentation of the issues set forth in an unverified Petition. This was not a suitable process 
under I.C. § 1-1622 and City of Boise. Further, it denied the interested Cities any due process 
despite the substantial financial stake they had in an order issued pursuant to I.C. § 1-2218. 
DATED this of June, 2013. 
DATED this_l£ day of June, 2013. 
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